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THE MAINTENANCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY
I
IN CATALONIA
Oriol Pi-Sunyer
University of Massachusetts
I

Ethnic groups--nationalities is perhaps a better term--preceded the
nation-state historically, and interethnic relations antedate international
relations.

In the medieval world, a multiplicity of languages, dialects,

and local cultural traditions were taken for granted and caused little
comment; in no way were they incompatible with the ties of personal
allegiance which peasant owed to lord and lord to king.

Regional rights

and regional legal structures were, at least ideally, recognized and
protected by the crown.

Pluralism was the rule rather than the exception.

With respect to language, diversity was seen as falling squarely
wi thin the natural order : it might be unfortunate that men spoke different
tongues, but this was attributed to human imperfection and perversity.
This is not to imply an absence of ethnic conflict, but apart from
the inhabitants of frontier regions and those individuals whose professions involved travel, very few men were in a position to experience
protracted contact with different ethnic groups.

Interethnic contact

was certainly limited, and interethnic conflict was seldom elevated to
a political cause.

III

In the contemporary Western world, however, the

nation~state

has

become the structure to which the individual is expected to give his
undivided allegiance.

From the Renaissance to the present, the history

of Europe suggests that the national directing elites distrust pluralism and view the monoethnic state as the ideal goal.

With only a little

exaggeration, post-medieval political philosophy could well be
phrased as one state, one language, one culture.
recognize that this is something of a constant.

2

para~

It is vital to
Although the monoethnic

\'
ideal has
its origins in the royal absolutism of the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, monarchists and republicans, liberals and conservatives, traditionalists and rationalists, all agreed on the virtues
of a strong centralized state.

The French Revolution did more to

com~

bat regionalism, branded in its linguistic aspects with the disparaging
label of "patois" (from Poi tiers in the Limousin), than all the royal
governments of the ancien regime.
Modern political ideologies appear late on the scene and have been
superimposed on an existing mosaic of cultural and linguistic diversity.
It is somewhat paradoxical that the same forces which contributed so
much to the molding of conscious nationality at the

center-~the

erosion

of traditional society, social and economic change, and the displacement
of traditional elites by new middle sectors--also transformed the old
ties of language, institutions, residence, and community, into aspirations for distinct regional identities.

Paradoxical, perhaps, but none

the less understandable, since the periphery and the center were influenced by much the same philosophies, read the same tracts, and
stirred to similar symbols.
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As Fishman

(1967:94) has noted:

- --

-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

- - --

--------------------

Here we find a consciousness of national history,
with its heroes and martyrs and national missions,
national grievances, national ideals. Here we find
a distinction between religion and nationality ,
even when everyone (or almost everyone) is of the
same religion (or irreligion). Here we find pride
in national literature with its poets and novelists
and with its literary schools, periods and styles.
Here we find a consciousness of national language,
with its avowed beauty, subtlety and precision.
Language ... becomes something to love, to fight for,
to live for, to die for; something to safeguard, to
develop, to enrich . ...
The difference lies in the frame of reference.

The nationalism of

ethnic communities pits itself against the weight and power of the state;
nationalism at the center is for the most part forged in the fires of
foreign wars and the pow-er struggles of international relations.

These

similarities highlight an essential truth: there is nothing archaic or
atavistic in the evolution of ethnic-regional demands.

In fact, a good

case can be made that in Europe modern regionalism is to a substantial
degree a postindustrial phenomenon (Cruells 1969:9).

Certainly the re-

cognition of ethnicity and language consciousness has tended to follow
the disintegration of traditional society, however much it may look to
the past for charters of validation (Huntington 1968; Silvert 1963).
Manifestations of this order may strike the casual observer as
somewhat Quaint (or even dangerously misguided) at a time when nationalism is often dismissed as an aberration of less enlightened times.
However, even the most cursory examination of third world politics,
minority aspirations in the United States, and conditions in present-day
Europe, indicate that the tides of nationalism continue to run very
strong.

In fact, not a few European ethnic communities regard them-

selves as victims of a form of internal colonialism.

That the world
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at large has generally been slow to see matters in quite this light is
at least in part attributable to the fact that many states have minority problems of their own.

Anticolonialism of the traditional type

directs attention to overseas dependencies (or spheres of influence)
and allows governments, including many with anti-minority policies, to
reap propaganda benefits in the current world political situation.

Sup-

port, even of a moral and non·-material nature, of ethnic enclaves within
the political borders of another state is an enterprise that few governments are willing to undertake.
For these reasons, within-country interethnic conflict in Europe
has enjoyed low visibility.
was a few years ago.

But this is much less true today than it

Just at

B.

time when Europe is witnessing a decay

of traditional nationalism and frontiers are increasingly regarded as
vestiges of the past (the

II

age of mass consumption" is in part respon-

sible for these changes), there is reawakening in various European
states of internal regional and national rivalries and aspirations.

We

see this in Ulster and in the hostility between Flemings and Walloons
in Belgium; the threat of Slovak secession helped the Russians to crush
Czech resistance in 1968; Cyprus is a land divided; in Yugoslavia the
Croats still fear Serbian imperialism; the Bretons and other French
minorities are uneasy under the control of Paris.

It would seem that

the winds of change in Europe are favoring both integration on the
grand

scale and the reemergence of a localism that has in many cases

remained dormant for the better part of a century (Fontaine 1971).
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II

Catalan regionalism and the cultural and psychological mechanisms
which Catalans use to maintain identity and cultural integrity are to a
certain degree type phenomena which can be duplicated among other Spanish minorities as well as elsewhere in Europe.

These situational and

functional parallels have not gone unnoticed in Catalonia (Porcel 1970a),
but there remain

factors, some longstanding, others more recent, that

are peculiar to the region and its history.
Catalans are concentrated in the northeastern triangle of the
Iberian peninsula and the adjoining French region of Roussillon.

Cata-

lans in Spain number some six million inhabitants in a total population
of thirty-three million .

Given that the national census (Insti tuto

Nacional de Estadlstica, or INE) does not collect information on linguistic affiliation or cross-tabulate data on place of birth and place
of residence, the figures for Catalan speakers which are to be found in
the literature must be regarded as informed estimates (Melia 1970:79-80;
Maluquer 196 5 : 135-136; Moll 1968 ).3

Six million, or something close to

it, is not an insignificant linguistic bloc (on the order of Swedish or
Bulgarian) but it still constitutes very much of a minority within the
Spani sh tot al.I
Industrialization is old in the region.

The outlines of an indus-

trial society, based originally on textiles, can be discerned as early
as the latter part of the eighteenth century.

By 1850, Catalonia was

experiencing a local variant of the industrial revolution (Vicens Vives
1969: 147-148 ).

Today, Catalonia remains the leading industrial region

of Spain, although the disparities between zones of early industrialization (the Basque lands and Catalonia) and the rest of the country are
shrinking.
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The early development of' a modern industrial base in Catalonia is
a f'actor of' some signif'icance.

In many parts of' Europe regional senti-

ments have been linked to conditions of' economic deprivation and general
underdevelopment.
oped zone.

Catalonia, however, is the opposite to an underdevel-

One consequence of' this is that the "brain drain" which has

attended provincialization in other countries--the migration of' the
skilled and the educated to national capitals and other centers of' development and employment--is not a major problem in the region.

The

middle class is substantial and autochthonous, while Barcelona, the
regional capital, is f'ullymetropolitan, demographically and otherwise
(Saez Buesa 1968: Alzina Caules 1966).
Spain, as Juan Linz (1966:270) has observed, is a land of' great
internal heterogeneity, not only of' the ethnic-regional variety, but
also with respect to social composition, levels of' development, and the
values and attitudes of' its constituent regions and sectors.

In the

taxonomy that Linz (1966:289) proposes, Catalonia f'alls into the category of' "Bourgeois Spain":
an area characterized by a low proportion of' unskilled workers--f'ew in the countryside and not
too many in the cities--but with a sUf'f'icient
number of' workers to reduce the proportion of'
those in nonmanual, that is, middle class, occupations in the cities and towns. In it
businessmen, managers, technicians, salesmen,
and white collar employees constitute a signif'icant part of' the middle class.
Working-class institutions, including trade unions and similar
associations, have a history of' several generations, the f'irst legal
trade unions and mutual aid societies in Spain having been organized
by Catalan textile workers in 1840 (Izard 1970: 62).
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By 1917 almost
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30,000 workers in the Barcelona area were enrolled in a variety of
trade unions, cooperatives, and mutual aid societies (Jutglar 1966).
The urban social structure of Catalonia is modern in the sense
that both its elites and working classes are very much products of the
transformations that accompanied industrialization.

The rural pattern

is different, but again somewhat atypical for the Mediterranean.

Rural

aristocracies were never as firmly entrenched in Catalonia (and other
northern regions of Spain) as they were in the rest of the country.

Thus,

two features typical of southern Spain, the concentration of rural property in a very few large estates and the presence of agrotowns inhabited
by masses of landless laborers, are singularly absent (Malefakis 1910:
93-130) .
If one of the underlying problems in Spain is lack of national integration due to disparities in regional development, a somewhat similar
cleavage has characterized urban-rural articulation in Catalonia.

His-

torically, peasants have felt threatened by a variety of forces emanating
from the city: the power of expanding capitalism, the radical political
philosophies of the urban proletariat, and the cultural paternalism of
the intellectuals.

Catalan peasants share with Catalan townsmen a sus-

picion of state centralization, but for the peasant, the dangers from
the center are not the only ones (Hansen 1969).
It would appear that on a variety of counts the cultural configurations of the region do not easily fit recognized categories of classification.

Catalans, and perhaps most fervently Catalan intellectuals,

regard themselves as a Mediterranean people, perhaps in counterpoise to
the essentially inland Castilians.

Historically, the fortunes of
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Catalonia and related principalities (jointly the Kingdom of Aragon)
were linked to trans-Mediterranean trade and political and military
influence extending as far east as Sicily and Greece.

Catalan med-

ieval high culture had its closest affinities with Provence and Aquitaine.

The climatic regime of coastal Catalonia and the arboreal and

field crops grown within this zone are clearly Mediterranean.
Nevertheless, some scholars classifY contemporary Catalonia as a
non-Mediterranean region (Pitkin 1963: 120).

Perhaps this is due to

a perception of Mediterranean societies as somewhat akin to Sjoberg's
(1960) pre-industrial urban-oriented polities: rigidly hierarchial,
tradi tional , administratively centralized, personalistic, and needless
to say, maintained on the surpluses skimmed from a subordinate peasantry (Morris 1968: 39-61).

A social and cultural entity that is

both "Mediterranean" and "developed" is apparently difficult to conceptualize, almost, in fact, a contradiction in terms.
Be this as it may, it is perfectly true that in many respects the
social structure of Catalonia finds its closest parallels in Western
Europe, and within Spain, the Basque Country.

Systems of patronage,

dyadic relations, and other interpersonal networks are important, as
they are in other Mediterranean lands.

Much less evident is the em-

phasis on codes of honor and shame (Peristiany 1966), a system of
values that has been linked to a paucity of institutional ties and the
compensatory development of family solidarity (Schneider 1971).

Not

that family and kin are without importance in Catalonia, but rather
that organizational problems are resolved in a variety of ways, of
which kin-based structures is only one.
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Given the frame of reference we have developed, Catalan nationalism must bridge the interests of diverse groups.

Ideally, it should

appeal not only to the bourgeoisie, but also to the industrial working
classes and to a basically conservative peasantry.

The presence of

class alignments add an extra dimension to what would otherwise be a
simple dichotomy between the state and the region, the center and the
periphery.
Also, one cannot escape the impression that Catalans are too prone
to dismiss the potential "Ulster" in their midst, the very substantial
non-Catalan working-class and lower-class enclaves of Castilian-speaking
immigrants and their descendants.

4

The argument that this minority

within a minority can, given the right conditions, be assimilated with
few problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne out by similar
historical cases (Kloss 1967).
Finally, any appraisal of Catalan society must take into account
the fact that the region is something of a developed enclave within a
largely semi developed country.

That this situation colors the perception

of Catalans and acts as a further point of friction between Catalans and
non-Catalans cannot be doubted.

The truth of the matter is that Catalans

engage in the same type of stereotyping, indulge in the same sort of
harsh judgement, with respect to Spaniards from underdeveloped provinces,
as the inhabitants of Lombardy reserve for Sicilians and other southern
Italians.

In much the same way as the Milanese look across the Alps to

Lyon and South Germany, the Catalan middle classes claim a greater
affinity with trans-Pyrenean Europe than with Extremadura and Andalusla.
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That the economic prosperity of Catalonia has in substantial degree
been gained by the importation of cheap labor is recognized by only
a minority of Catalans.

III

It may be said that for Catalans language is the prime symbol of
group membership and the clearest line of demarcation separating them
from other Spaniards.

From the other side of the linguistic fence,

Catalan is a constant reminder of regional particularism.

One can

understand, therefore, why Catalan and its uses, the efforts made to
nurture it in What continues to be a largely hostile environment, and
its prospects for the future, remain matters of deep concern.
Today, most Catalans, certainly most Catalan intellectuals, would
agree that the language is in deep crisis, that the odds are heavy,
and the struggle is bound to be difficult.

These fears find expression

in the words of a Catalan linguist:
We have always said that the countryside is our
reserve, but today it is very undermined by television, a medium which is very influential ... I
know small children who are just beginning to
talk who learn many of their first words from
television. If it were not that we now again
have books in Catalan, that the records have
helped us so much, that everyday the educational
levels are rising, I would see things as very
hopeless. Matters have come very close, but I
believe that it is not too late.
(Porcel 1970b:2l)
Television, of course, is in Castilian.
cerns the current nova

can~o

(new song) movement.

type have been voiced by informants.
fessional :
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The reference to records conOpinions of the same

According to one young pro-

. ....... - ~--

-

•....
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Even the best intentioned non-Catalans are apt
to chide us for what they regard as our stubbornness. We are told that the use of a minority
language breeds a ghetto mentality and a ghetto
culture. Some say that we are going against the
times, that to be burdened by a minority language
is a luxury we can ill afford. Other observers
sing the praises of bilingualism, but what they
generally mean is that we should be fluent in
Castilian. Actually, we are already bilingual in
a rather special sense: most of us read and write
Castilian considerably better that we do Catalan;
most of us speak Catalan better than we do Castilian.
Believe me, it is not always a very comfortable
situation.
This fear of language loss is not without historical precedent.

We

would not claim that the events of the past influence the current perception of all speakers of Catalan, but for what we may call the literate
members of a literate society, history offers models that are readily
at hand.

In the middle ages Catalan was the language of the peasantry,

but flourished also as a major court and literary language.

In short,

while there were discernible differences between "common" and "polite"
speech (as well as local dialectal differences), all segments of society
spoke the same basic language.
Late in the fifteenth century the Catalan language entered a long
period of decline which was to last until the second half of the nineteenth century.

The factors responsible were many and need not be exam-

ined in detail.

They included catastrophic wars and a series of internal

calamities, both social and economic.

To some degree these were events

peculiar to the region, while in part they also reflected a more general
decline in Mediterranean principalities (RegIa 1966).
In 1469 Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Aragon, married Isabella,
the heiress of Castile.

The union of the two crowns resulted in a shift
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in the center of political gravity.

In the following centuries, the

Kingdom of Aragon underwent changes which transformed an important
Mediterranean state into a dependent principality and finally into a
cluster of Spanish provinces.
The Catalan directing classes, in particular the higher aristocracy, adjusted to this change by becoming monolingually Castilian, or
more commonly, applying a diglossic formula (Ferguson 1959; Fishman
1967; Vallverdu

1970b; Badia i Margarit 1964: 135-148).

Catalan might

be retained for intimate and personal contexts--the family correspondence of the Borgias is written in Catalan--but Castilian was reserved
for serious events and important occasions.
The emergence of Spain as a world power, including her initial
dominant role in the New World, coincided with a florescence in Spanish
letters, a factor which could not but influence the prestige of the
Castilian language.

The evidence indicates that it was these determin-

ants and influences, rather than conscious state policies, which by
default left the peasantry as the chief guardians of the Catalan language.

The realization that in centuries past the elites rather willing-

ly (or at least without much evident resistance) discarded their
linguistic patrimony continues to haunt educated Catalans.
The industrialization of Catalonia ushered in a period of cultural
and linguistic renaissance, La

Renaixen~a.

Initially a movement concerned

with literary revival and the formulation of modern grammatical and
orthographic rules, it merged in due course with Catalanisme, a more

con~

sciously political philosophy which drew support and momentum from the
rising bourgeoisie.
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Such efforts at cultural revitalization linked with

---------- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - -

a growing political awareness and nationalist aspirations were not
unusual for the Europe of the period.

In common with most nineteenth

century nationalist movements, Catalanisme was basically conservati vereformist in orientation; it certainly did not emphasize social and
political solutions of a radical nature (Sole-Tura 1967).

Stress was

placed on the reacquisition of some degree of local autonomy and the
value of the local language and local institutions.

We may take as

representative of the demands of the period a petition forwarded by a
commission of Catalan notables to Alfonso XII in 1885:
What we desire ,Sir, is that in Spain there be
implemented an adequate regional system ...
similar to those found in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, Germany, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain; a system already followed in
Spain in the years of our greatness. We wish
this not only for Catalonia but for all the
other provinces of Spain ... Our administrative
structures have been destroyed ... We cannot use
our language except in the home and in familiar
conversation ... strong attempts are being made
to destroy, or at least weaken, our civil rights,
which are the basic foundation of the robust and
moral Catalan family and of our property ....
(Quoted by Jutglar 1969:177)
However, by the early decades of the twentieth century, Catalanisme
had sufficiently broadened its base of participation to include substantial segments of the industrial working class and the peasantry.

A

number of political parties covering the spectrum from conservative to
left-of-center subscribed to a core of basic demands, a situation made
easier by the fact that tests of ideological purity were never entrenched
as part of the Catalanist philosophy.

Catalanisme could, and did, shelter

such_ di verse groups as conservative businessmen, middle-class professionals
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and intellectuals, socialist workers, and peasant smallholders. 5

Some

political parties were frankly regionalist in orientation, but no single
party was in the position of being able to claim that it represented the
interest of everyone within the region.
This is not to deny that there was a good deal of factionalism in
the Catalonia of the nineteen twenties and the nineteen thirties.
the rest of Spain, these were years of strife and civil war.

As in

What may

be termed the Catalan coalition was splintered under the stresses of
conflicting p01itical philosophies and the pressures of the Civil War,
but not before the four Catalan provinces had experienced limited home
rule and the opportunity to exercise cultural autonomy within the framework of the Spanish Republic.
The Republican defeat in the Civil War was followed by a period of
political, cultural, and linguistic repression.

The Catalan language

press, which numbered 400 periodicals of all political shades in 1930,
was closed down; the use of Catalan in the schools and the university
was proscribed; all official business had again to be transacted in
Castilian.

It is not necessary to claim that the years of the Republic

represent some kind of golden age for the people of Catalonia; sufficient that many Catalans are of the opinion that the Republican experiment pointed the way to a better fUture, although a great number of
important problems remained to be resolved.
All such hopes appeared to collapse with the Republican defeat of
1939.

The Catalonia of the early seventies is certainly not the same

as the Catalonia of the early forties.

Pressures have been eased and

the physical conditions of life have improved for sUbstantial segments
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of the population.

There is still no Catalan language press (with the

exception of a few magazines), but on the other hand a recent catalogue
of Catalan books in print (INLE 1969) numbers over 4,000 titles; television and radio remain virtually monolingual, but records of Catalan
music, including modern "protest" works, enjoy a brisk trade.

Education

at all levels is conducted in Castilian, although a new educational law
currently under consideration includes provisions for the use of regional
languages in the schools.

Censorship of the written word has relaxed, but

remains as a background threat.

It need hardly be pointed out that no

formal political opposition is permitted in Catalonia, or elsewhere in
Spain, and that stringent limitations are placed on assembly and the
activities of political groups and other associations.
This is not to say that some outlets cannot be found for culturalpolitical expression.

Given the current restrictions, the usual tech-

nique is to utilize whatever loopholes are to be found in the legal
structure and make the best possible use of a limited range of institutional and interpersonal structures.

An examination of the techniques

in vogue, and the tactical gains which such techniques allow, will
occupy the remaining portion of this essay.
IV
Before 1939, the forms and content of ethnic and political expression were, like the social and economic structures of the region, of the
type that one might expect to encounter in an essentially modern industrial society.

Ethnic identity did draw on ancient images and, as is

the case with most cultural revivals, contained a mixture of antiquarian,
contemporary, and progressive themes.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong
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to view Catalans as an ethnic group operating in a traditional context·
What strikes the observer is the organized quality of Catalan ethnic
life prior to 1939, the interest in politics and the range of political
parties, the educational institutions, and the cultural-ethnic associations which flourished during the first four decades of the present
century.
Some ethnic groups are aided in the maintenance of their identity
by reason of isolation or dependence upon a given environment (Barth
1969:19; Blom 1969), but no such factors are discernible in present-day
Catalonia.

Even the concept of the Catalans as a strictly geographic

enclave is hardly warranted.

As already noted, many non-Catalans re-

side within the geographic confines of Catalonia, also, substantial
Catalan communities are to be found abroad, mostly in Western Europe
and Latin America.
Ethnicity for Catalans is above all a matter of ascription and
identification: one is a Catalan because one feels oneself to be and is
recognized as such by other members of the ethnic group.

Outsiders,

both foreigners and in some instances even non-Catalan nationals, are
hard put to recognize the full range of cultural codes which Catalans
utilize to signal group membership.

In part, this is a function of

the t'low profile" which Catalans maintain with respect to acti vi ties
of an ethnic-nationalist nature, but it is also evidence of the fact
that Catalans have for centuries formed part of the larger social,
political and economic structures which constitute Spain.
These common cultural attributes hinder the identification of regional traits and patterns, but more than this, the appearance of
commonality is reinforced by externally imposed regulations which limit
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or prohibit some of the standard expressions of cultural difference.
We have already commented on the control of the mass media.

In much the

same way, street names and advertis ements, and virtually all those
highly visible indicators that one tends to associate with a distinct
cultural and linguistic tradition in a complex society, are rendered in
Castilian.

If we add to this the observation that Catalans will almost

automatically address the obvious stranger in Castilian, it is not
surprising that many foreigners can traverse the length of Catalonia
wi thout becoming aware that the natives regard themselves as d.istinct
from other Spaniards.
It is nevertheless possible to distinguish at least three levels
or modes of cultural affirmation.

The first is essentially symbolic

and involves the individual use of recognized cultural idioms.

The

second entails a more formal organizational commitment--working with
others--but typically the ethnic-political aims of such groups are not
readily apparent.

Finally, there are organizations that operate under-

ground and are legally proscribed.

I will deal only with the first two

categories since they have greater currency and there arise some obvious
ethical questions that limit discussion of the third.

An individual may express his ethnic identity in a multitude of ways.
Speaking Catalan, reading Catalan books, and listening to Catalan records
are in themselves affirmations of ethnicity.

Many middle-class Catalans

not only make it a point to speak the language, but support their actions
by citing inconsistencies in the current situation.

For example, quite

a few informants were aware that Spain is a signatory of the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Decl~ation of Human Rights, and the 1960
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UNESCO Convention on discrimination in education.

Each of these in-

struments has some bearing on language use and broader questions of
cultural pluralism and the protection of minority rights.

In somewhat

the same category fall the efforts that have been made to exploit the
Vatican guidelines on the use of the vernacular in religious observances
and other activities.

Most often cited are the recommendations of

Vatican II and the Papal encyclical Pacem in terris.
Religion also offers a number of visual signals that carry an ethnic
message, such as medals or medallions featuring St. George, patron of
Catalonia, or the Virgin on Montserrat, a shrine closely associated with
ethnic aspirations.

More obvious are jewelry items and decals elaborated

around the Catalan flag.

At times affirmations of this kind are carried

off with a certain wry humor, as in the case of a taxi driver who had
affixed a notice to the back of the front seat informing the passenger:
"I speak French and German," and in much larger type, "I ALSO SPEAK
CATALAN."
Before examining groups and associations that engage in activities
designed to further ethnic goals, some further elaboration on the Catalan middle class and the patterns of interaction of its members is in
order.

The reader will bear in mind that it is from this social stratum

that most of the field information for this essay is derived.

Although

we have previously stressed that Catalans are group-oriented--they share
with Americans a certain propensity to be "joiners "--the local middle
class lends itself beautifully to the operation of linkages of a less
formal kind, what have been variously described as networks, quasi
groups, action-sets, and cliques (Mayer 1966; Barnes 1954; Frankenberg

1966: 242; Wolf 1966: 15).
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Coalitions of this sort are more loosely

structured and are functionally less specific than entities designed
for a particular purpose.
Catalonia is a society with a small and relatively homogenous elite
inhabiting a circumscribed physical and social space.

Under such con-

ditions a village-like situation arises--I have heard Barcelona referred
to as a

II

small hankerchief"--that mitigates against anonymity and makes

it possible for almost everyone to know everyone else.

In the case of

strangers from within the middle class it is generally the work of minutes to establish common ground on the basis of a third person known to
both individuals.
A number of standard mechanisms are used in establishing affinity:
family name and kin (facilitated by the Spanish system of using both
patronym and matronym); region of origin; school and university experience;
profession and professional associations.

Virtually all middle-class

Catalans have attended private secondary schools and the vast majority
of university graduates have been trained at the University of Barcelona.
Needless to say, such networks lend themselves to a variety of uses
and functions, for instance, brokerage and patronage, which fall outside
the s cope of our present consideration (Wolf 1956; Adams 1970).

At the

same time, though, they offer an interrelational field within which expression and discussion may be conducted with few fears of outside intervention.

I could not escape the impression that the very difficulties

inherent in establishing and maintaining associations of a more formal
(I\'

nature has led to a situation in which much activity bearing on ethnicity
and nationalism takes place in loosely structured, sometimes ad hoc, networks and cliques.

Formal groups are easier to identity and public

129

meetings require official permits, although this stipulation can be
circumvented in a number of ways.

But, to cite one example, it is

simply not feasible for the authorities to regulate something like the
traditional

~nya,

or restaurant.

the weekly informal get-together held at some bar

The penya has a fairly flexible membership, say a dozen

individuals, typically all males.

Apart from the congeniality of eating

and drinking, exchanging gossip and catching up with the news, the penya
provides an excellent forum for political discussion.

Since everyone

knows everyone else, or at least each individual has established firm
bona fides, the atmosphere is relaxed and talk is spirited.
Catalan ethnic identity is also maintained through more formal
channels.

The trick is to develop groups and associations able to skirt

the regulations limiting rights of assembly.

Typical of such entities

are outing and excursion clubs, folk dange and folk song groups, cinema
clubs, and alumnae associations.

All such collectivities have one char-

acteristic in common: there is considerable disparity between purported
functions and actual aims.

Thus, a cinema group may be established for

the apparent purpose of showing movies, and in fact, movies are shown;
but following the presentation there is a period of discussion, and
since "discussion" is broadly interpreted, it is likely to range far
beyond cinematographic techniques and the talents of the actors.
over-all approach has been described as follows:
The gambit with us has always been the same: take
measures and approaches that are very modest and
legal and build on them. What we say is this:
"Tread carefully so as not to scare the hare, then
catch it before it wakes!" Once we have our foot
in the door it is too late for the authorities to
do much about it. Thus with song, our big break
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came when Raimon [ a leading Catalan folk singer]
won the first prize at the Mediterranean Song
Festival [Barcelona 1967]. The authorities
suddenly reali zed 'That was going on) but they had
lost the game. They then tried to apply pressure
and make life difficult for us, but one is never
pushed back all the way. And, of course, as soon
as performers are known outside the country they
develop a certain international following and thus
a degree of immunity.
The Catholic Church in Catalonia is difficult to categorize, but one
thing is certain: it is not monolithic, either in attitude or organization.
At the risk of simplification, we can say that it includes a conservativetraditional (even reactionary) component basically in agreement with the
regime, a more progressive wing drawing its inspiration from Christian
Democracy and related movements, and an element in tune with the new wave
of radical Catholicism that is presently so much in evidence throughout
Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States.

This division, which

barely sketches out the diversity of opinion within the church, is not, of
course, limited to Catalonia, but may be found throughout Spain.
Within Catalonia, though, the progressive components, made up mostly
of the younger clergy , but including also some established churchmen,
have strongly supported regional aspirations.

Since the end of the Civil

War, the Monastery of Montserrat has been a focal point of resistance and
an enduring symbol of local independence.

In the years immediately follow-

ing the Civil War, when the possibilities of cultural and political expression were really limited, many Catalans made the pilgrimage to Montserrat where the monks openly defied the ban on the use of the Catalan
language in the pulpit.
The authorities have at times strongly reacted to such manifestations of ethnic and political opposition .

Priests and monks have been
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exiled and imprisoned and on May 11, 1966, the Policia Armada (a national
gendarmerie) attacked a silent march of 130 priests and monks which was
making its way from the Cathedral of Barcelona to police headquarters in
order to deliver a letter of protest concerning police brutality (Anon.

1966) .
Still, and taking into account the very evident dangers of opposition, the church does fall outside the normal areas of government control
and consequently constitutes a kind of privileged sanctuary.

As a case

in point, there are some twenty associations of the lay apostolate in
Catalonia, associations recruited from a local base and catering to local
needs.

Similarly, the greater freedom of church-related organizations

from government censorship and other forms of interference has made
possible the pUblication of books and magazines of a kind which no private publishing house would dare to print.
The use of religious organizations in the furtherance of ethnic and
political demands is a variant of the technique examined earlier in this
section.

There is little doubt that everyone understands what is being

done, but the regime, which in part bases its claim to legitimacy on a
supposed defense of Catholic Christianity, must tread with some care
when faced with an opposition that can quote the pope and work within
the context of established and recognized ecclesiastical organizations.
The mechanisms which we have described so far all have a direct
bearing on ethnic identity.

The ethnic factor may not always be readily

evident, in fact it may be subsumed or hidden rather than manifest for
the very good reason that direct expressions of ethnicity carry the
danger of repression.
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But having stripped away such protective coloration,

the message is clear.

Very different, and even harder to recognize with-

out some knowledge of local sentiments, is a phenomenon of displacement
or identification that leads Catalans to champion the causes of minority
groups other than their own.
There are two non-Catalan groups, the Basques and the Israelis (and
by extension Jews in general), that seem to enjoy a psychological special
relationship in Catalonia.

That the Basques are admired should come as

no surprise, but an understanding of the admiration that is felt for Jews
and Israelis is initially more puzzling.
Again and again this past summer (1970) informants expressed the
deepest regard for Israel and vocally identified with the Jewish experience of suffering and persecution, cultural revitalization, and eventual
success in the face of great odds.
policy is strongly pro-Arab.

In contrast to this, Spanish official

The regime does not maintain full diplo-

matic relations with Israel (no links at the ambassadorial level), but
ambassadors are accredited to every major Arab capital.

Reactions to

the Six Day War cast further light on Catalan attitudes and the gulf
separating these attitudes from official government policy.

While the

Spanish press, no doubt following official guidelines, was generally
hostile to Israel, two hundred Catalan intellectuals issued a signed
manifesto supporting the Israeli cause.
Strong pro-Israeli feelings are especially marked among the young
who, unlike a number of their American age mates, seem to have been
little influenced by the mystique of Palestinian guerrillas.

In a region

where the Israelis lack anything in the way of a natural constituency-there are but a few thousand native-born Jews in all Catalonia--it is
surprising to find so many young men and women who dance the hora, sing
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Hebrew songs, evidence more than a casual knowledge of Israeli culture,
and consume a steady stream of literature with Jewish and Israeli

.

themes.

6

Basques and Israelis are not the only two nationalities or

ethnic groups that find emotional support in Catalonia, but they are
the two most favored, the two most respected.
Taken together, all these techniques of resistance add up to holding actions, or at the best, tactical victories of a largely symbolic
form--an affirmation that "something is being done."

Responses of this

kind are typical of situations where the organizations of a subordinate
group have been proscribed, and where militant (or too overt) activity
by the subordinate group is kept in check by force or threat of force.
The cultural codes used to assert ethnic difference and political
opposition, the two being virtually synonymous, are well understood within the subordinate group, and to some degree at least, by the agents of
state authority.

The options open to the authorities are, however,

limited by either the diffuseness of the target or by the nature of the
terrain that the subordiante group has elected to fight on.
The very difficulties inherent in establishing formal organizations
of resistance have, I believe, mitigated against the dangers of factionalism and rigidity.

There has been a scaling down of ethnic-national

activity to the level of symbolic action and forms of expression likely
to have the broadest regional appeal.

While my data does not allow me

to generalize for all components of the Catalan population, my impression is that such a scaling down has helped to bridge social divisions
(class, occupational, rural-urban, generational, etc.) and forced individuals to concentrate on a fee fundamentals such as freedom of linguistic
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and cultural expression and a return to democratic forms of government.
This leaves for the future such potentially thornier questions as the
exact nature of the social and economic system to be achieved following
the demise of the present regime.

Similarly, while it is possible for

Catalans to discuss the kind of relationships and links that a democratic
Catalonia should have with (or within) a democratic Spain, the formulation of concrete alternatives can await the time when the Spanish people
as a whole are once again in a position to make their will known.
Turning specifically to the Catalan middle class, organizational
limitations are compensated for by the smallness of scale of the society.
In such societies, role relationships tend to be particularistic rather
than universalistic.

The smallness of the social field means that there

is a good deal of overlap, that many roles are played by relatively few
individuals.

In turn, this means that there is a good deal of on-going

contact and that. consequently formal structures can to some degree be
dispensed with (Gluckman 1955: 18-19; Firth 1951:
Benedict 1966: 25-27).

47; Parsons 1951;

In part by necessity, and in part by the nature

of the social structure, we have a kind of village pump society writ
large.

This too, has some obvious advantages under the present con-

ditions since it assures communication, the exchange of views and
opinions, adjustment and compromise; in short, substantial flexibility.
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NOTES

1 This paper is based on the sources cited and on information
gathered in the course of my own field work in Catalonia during the
summer of 1970.

It should be understood that while I interviewed in-

formants drawn from different walks of life, most of my contacts were
with middle-class Catalans resident in Barcelona.

Field research

was financed by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health.
This assistance has made possible the present report as well as related research now in preparation.
2

The concept of absolutism developed together with the modern

idea of political sovereignty, two facets of an ideology of power concentration.

In concrete terms, this implied that over every indiv-

idual and over every piece of territory there should be but one
undisputed authority with the right to compel uniformity by sanction
or threat of sanction.

This claim was even extended to the religious

field where the principle was formulated as cujus regio, ejus religio,
the right of princes to determine the religion of their subjects.

As

with other ideologies at other times, this one found support in the
writings of contemporary philosophers.

Jean Bodin's De la Republique

(1576) and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) are prime examples of the
genre.

Books II and V of that handbook on statecraft, Niccolo Machia-

velli's 11 principe (1532), can be read as an early statement of absolutist and centralist principles.

3 This figure is based on estimates of language use.

While Cata-

lan is one language, three mutually understandable dialects are spoken

136

in Spain: Catalan as spoken in Catalonia proper (often regarded as "standard Catalan"); Catalan as spoken in Valencia (valencia); and the Catalan
used in the Balearic Islands, termed mallorqul after the largest island
of the group.

These dialectic differences are not without current poli-

tical relevance.

The semiofficial Instituto Nacional del Libro Espanol

(INLE) breaks down the statistics of books published in Catalan into the
three dialect categories giving to each the value of a language designation (in Castilian: lengua catalana, lengua valenciana, and lengua mallorquina), thus ignoring the basic unity of the Catalan language (Vallverdu
1970a: 51-52).

On the position of valencia and the cultural and linguis-

tic pressures faced by the people of Valencia see Lluls V. Aracil's A
Valencian Dilemma (1966).

Catalan is also spoken in Andorra, where it

enjoys the status of an official language, and across the Pyrenees in
Rousillon, today the French Department of Pyrenees-Orientales.

4For a review of the literature on population and immigration in
Catalonia see Boix Selva (1967).

Botella (1968) has written a short

survey on recent demographic trends in Catalonia.

Two articles (Alzina

Caules 1966; Aramburo Campoy 1966) tackle the more specific questions of
population and migratory movements in Barcelona.

For census data, both

national and regional, consult the national census published every ten
years and the Anuario Estadlstico de Espana issued yearly, both are
published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadlstica.

As might be expected,

immigrants from other parts of Spain (and earlier from rural Catalonia)
have been especially drawn to Barcelona and its satellite industrial
towns.

Immigrants, and children of immigrants (individuals of non-Catalan

origin) today make up about half of greater Barcelona's almost two million inhabitants.

This immigrant population is composed of two distinct

entities:
137

1. A component, almost entirely of peasant and small
town background, drawn mainly from the most impoverished regions of Spain: the south (Extremadura,
Andalucla), the central meseta, and Galicia in the
northwest.

When Catalans refer to "immigrants" it

is this element they have in mind.
2. A much smaller, but socio-culturally very important,
group recruited from the Spanish national elite.

Its

links are not to regions and localities (although
madrilenos seem well-represented), but to the national
power s truct ure .
Working- and lower-class immigrants are concentrated in the poor
neighborhoods near the port and in the industrial suburbs which ring
Barcelona.

The Castilian-speaking bureaucrats, military, professionals

and businessmen reside in middle-class districts throughout the city.
They form part of, and strongly identity with, Spanish national culture.
Little research has been done on either group.

My impression is that

contacts between middle-class Catalans and middle-class Castilians tend
to be limited to work-related situations.
rant a major research effort.

The poorer immigrants war-

Their move to the city is typically a

permanent shift in residence and their modes of adaptation and the
reception which they encounter should be studied in depth.

One aspect

of. immigrant ex;perience ...... the conditions of life of the most impoverished elements--has been examined with sensitivity and understanding in
two books by the Valencian author Francese Candel, Donde la ciudad
cambia

138

9U

nombre (1957), a novel, and Els altres catalans (1964), a

piece of descriptive journalism.

Badia i Margarit (1969) has conducted

a very detailed study of language use in Barcelona.

While this research

gives us ample information on language distribution and bilingualism in
different Barcelona districts, the work is descriptive rather than analytical.

A second volume, now in pre paration in devoted to analysis and

interpretation of language use p atte rns.
5 In many respects, the Catalan bourgeoisie evidenced a kind of
delayed political development.

In the early decades of the present cen-

tury, it appears that idologically they shared more in common with political movements typical of small enclave nationalities, such as Slovaks
and Croatians, than with the tides of political thinking then running in
some of the larger European countries.

During the nineteen twenties and

thirties, the indu?trial directing classes stressed regional values and
rejected theories of state intervention in the economy, preferring instead
to place their faith on a combination of free market operation (within
Spain) and the support of personal liberties.

A major consequence of this

orientation was that on the whole the Catalan bourgeoisie were little
attracted to Fascism and similar ideologies giving to the state a major
role in the economy and other areas of national life.

On the other hand,

some of the solutions proposed for coping with social and economic problems seem hardly realistic.

Thus, as late as 1931, when Catalan industry

was experiencing the full impact of the depression, the platform of the
major liberal party in Catalonia seriously proposed a program of return
to the land in the belief that re-ruralization would not only ease unemployment, but be in keeping with an image if society that saw an independent peasantry as the foundation of Catalan tradition (Pinilla de
las Heras 1968: 153).
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6 This may not be a phenomenon limited to Catalonia.

I noted with

interest (New York Times, December 3, 1970) that among the books seized
by the Spanish police in the apartment of an arrested Basque nationalist
there figured Leon Uris' Mila 18, a novel about the Warsaw ghetto uprising.
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